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ABSTRACT 
 
 In order to provide preventative security to a homogeneous device network, 
techniques in addition to static encryption must be implemented to assure network 
integrity by identifying possible deviant nodes within the collective. This thesis proposes 
a set of algorithms and techniques for an intrusion detection system, which when 
combined, provide a two-stage approach that seeks to reduce or eliminate training period 
requirements, while providing multiple anomaly detection and a degree of self tuning. By 
utilizing a high level of behavioral abstraction, these intrusion detection techniques can 
be applied to a broad range of devices, network implementations, and scenarios. Each 
device node is supplied with an embedded intrusion detection system which allows it to 
monitor inter-device requests, enabling machine learning techniques for purposes of 
deviant node analysis. The two principal methods, a maxima detection scheme, and a 
cross-correlative detection scheme, are combined to create a two-phase detection scheme 
that can successfully determine deviant node pervasion percentages of up to 22% within 
the homogeneous device network.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 When analyzing the broad range and applications utilizing concepts and designs 
for embedded systems, the importance of inter-device communications becomes 
extremely clear: communication and collaboration among devices serve as the backbone 
for system productivity in a highly networked environment. For this reason, there are 
implications in the methods, protocols and design considerations whereby 
communication is established, and arguably just as important, protected. Thus, 
information security, in its many forms, provides a needed level of protection to 
communications protocols present within the scope of interconnected devices. For the 
most part, information security relies on preventive methods to protect content, using 
static techniques such as obfuscation of source, encryption of data (satisfying the need for 
confidentiality), and source integrity by means such as digital signatures. As a first line of 
defense, static security methods are steadfast and proven methods of protecting data; The 
RSA[1-4] encryption standard, 3DES[4, 5], and AES[6, 7] all remain, at the time of this 
writing, effective and secure.  
 Perhaps the biggest obstacle to providing accurate information security using 
static methods is that a point of trust is always required; at some point, there must exist a 
trusted resource relationship, whether it is in the transmission of a public key1, or a 
                                                 
1
 RSA encryption relies on the difficulty of factoring near-prime numbers; because a common public key 
combined with a strong private key yields a nearly un-factorable challenge, RSA is considered safe. 
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shared secret. Because of this trusted relationship, there always exists the possibility that 
despite the integrity and strength of the algorithm being used, the static method can be 
defeated, however unlikely the scenario may be. For instance, WEP2 [8, 9] encryption 
commonly used to secure wireless networks relies on a solid, trustworthy encryption 
method that is traditionally known to be safe. However, the particular implementation of 
the algorithm within the scope of the wireless network protocol is flawed [10], allowing 
the security protocol to be cracked within minutes, given enough data, time and 
resources. 
 Because of this point-of-trust issue, the most disturbing problem with static 
protection methods is that once broken, they are no longer able to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the system to which they are applied. Even more problematic is 
providing any sort of detection that the security implementation has been broken in the 
first place. Although temporal breach protection solutions exist, such as 
encryption/decryption key rotations and replacement algorithms, it would not be 
unforeseen that broken once, the security scheme can be broken again. To ameliorate the 
damage from such breaches, measures containing dynamic approaches to security must 
be considered. In particular, intrusion detection provides means by which anomalies in 
general system behaviors can be analyzed and graded on the threat they pose.  
 Such a dynamic system would have the capabilities of securing a wide variety of 
applications, from general networked computing to specialized, applied embedded 
                                                                                                                                                 
Recently, a commonly-held public key used for 1024-bit RSA encryption was defeated (indicating that the 
private key could be factored without prior knowledge). 
2
 Wired Equivalency Protection 
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devices sharing a network connection. An Intrusion Detection System3 may operate in a 
variety of methods, such as performing individual packet-level analysis of incoming and 
outgoing network traffic. Indeed, IDSs typically use packet monitoring [1, 7, 11-23] with 
the aid of a probabilistic model to determine whether or not a network is the subject of an 
intrusion. Primarily effective in determining intrusions in protocol-specific environments 
where the range of input data is unbounded4, traffic-based IDSs are not as applicable to 
the embedded systems paradigm. In this case, an applied computational scenario has been 
established and localized to a set of known behaviors and parameters.  
 This work describes an embeddable IDS that utilizes the known aspects of an 
applied system’s communications network, whether present in an autonomous vehicle 
collective or mobile sensor device network, to form the basis for accurate intrusion 
detection in a low-power, high-level context. Two principal methods of intrusion 
detection are proposed and analyzed, and ultimately hybridized to create a resultant IDS 
that delivers the capability of detecting multiple intrusions along with low-resource 
utilization and a desirable level of system accuracy.  
 In order to provide a desirable level of intrusion detection, and of equal 
importance, resistance to attempts to defeat the IDSs functionality and accuracy, the IDS 
mechanisms presented in this work seek to thwart intrusion by making an attack much 
more difficult to plan and execute. Of course, no IDS is perfect unless the operational 
context is static and exactly prescribed before runtime, a case scenario that is not 
considered as it is impractical to consider for real-world applications. Therefore, the IDS 
                                                 
3
 This document shall refer to an Intrusion Detection System with the acronym IDS 
4
 Considered unbounded as the data contained in packets is not analyzed; the content is not considered 
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mechanisms presented here, and summarized by a hybridized approach, offer resistance 
in various forms: 
1. Requiring the attacker to have intimate knowledge of the system it is 
attacking: In order to escape detection by an IDS, an attacker would need to 
know all operational details with a high level of precision and determinism. This 
is often information that is not accessible or available, and thus lack of intimate 
knowledge makes planning difficult for an attacker.  
2. Extending the attack time window to impractical lengths: Because the IDSs 
use machine learning and statistical analysis methods over time, the attacker 
would need to expand its mission timeframe so severely that the attack may not be 
successful.  
3. Requiring timed injections: An attacker must be able to time its injections and 
pad its behavior with “normal” system behaviors so that its behavior does not trip 
thresholds and monitoring techniques that rely on statistical inference and 
temporal study. To do this, the attacker would need to master the “intimate 
knowledge” point in this list, further complicating an attack. 
  The points listed above present reasons by which a successful IDS can 
thwart an attacker – by making the possible attack very difficult to plan, time, and 
implement. The methods seen in the next chapters help to mitigate attack potential by: (1) 
complicating a potential attack, (2) making it unfeasible, and (3) reducing the possibility 
of network compromise. 
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Organization 
 
 This thesis work will be organized as follows: 
• Chapter Two: Necessary concepts for understanding IDS methodology, 
constructs, and an example scenario 
• Chapter Three: Description of the first IDS method, called Maxima Detection 
• Chapter Four: Description of the second IDS method, called the Cross-Correlative 
Intrusion Detection System 
• Chapter Five: A description of a hybridized IDS, called HybrIDS 
• Chapter Six: A conclusion detailing the overall implications of the methodologies 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CONCEPT PRIMITIVES AND SCENARIO 
 
 To better illustrate the functional aspects of the IDSs that will be described in the 
next few chapters, it is worthwhile to introduce an operational scenario to examine the 
application and contextual aspects of the IDS. In particular, this document will focus on 
the benefits provided to an ad-hoc network comprised of homogeneous networked nodes. 
Such a collective may be defined as a group of autonomous aircraft, ground vehicles, 
networked media players capable of sharing and transmitting data, joint attack smart 
munitions (such as the U.S. Military’s JDAM – Joint Directed Attack Munitions [24]), or 
any other configuration of networked nodes that comply with the ad-hoc, homogeneous 
requirement.  
 
Scenario: ADS-B 
 
 The case scenario presented here involves a modified version of the Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) system used to provide flight status 
information and collision avoidance to a network of interconnected aircraft and ground-
based receiver stations. For this thesis, the focus will only be on inter-aircraft 
communications. 
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 To gain an understanding of how an IDS might be integrated into such a broadcast 
mechanism, it is useful to characterize the existing system. ADS-B broadcast messages 
contain five unique, aircraft-centric data points and/or vectors, specifying: 
• GPS Position information  
• Altitude of the aircraft 
• Rate of climb 
• Velocity vector 
• Aircraft ID tag 
 These data points are broadcast typically at intervals of 2 Hz [25-28], and are 
received by any nearby aircraft. Software implemented on various other modules aboard 
the aircraft is then responsible for decoding the broadcast stream and performing 
decisions according to the information presented. 
 
Changes to the ADS-B Model 
 
 Because IDSs are typically implemented in scenarios where bidirectional 
communications is required, the current ADS-B specification is therefore not a proper 
application of IDS technology. Because of this, the ADS-B specification has been 
adapted to include the need for inter-aircraft requests, and two specific directives for 
theoretical use in autonomous aircraft missions were added. The modifications are as 
follows: 
• GPS Position information request 
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• Altitude of the aircraft request 
• Rate of climb request 
• Velocity vector request 
• Mission update request 
• Redirection request 
• Mission start request 
• Mission end request 
• Emergency/evasive action request 
• Priority/dominance leader/follower change request 
 The reader will notice that the “ID Tag” item has been removed from the previous 
specification. It is assumed therefore that in performing bidirectional communications 
with other aircraft nodes, the notion of the need for a specific aircraft identifier is handled 
by the communications protocol itself, and thus abstracted away from the purposes of this 
research. 
 Six additional functions have been added to the ADS-B system specification, 
along with the requirement that instead of a non-directed broadcast, each connected 
aircraft node makes specific requests of other devices according to the newly-proposed 
items listed above. The first new addition, that of a mission update request, simply is a 
query to other connected aircraft to supply the requester with an updated profile of its 
mission information. This allows for dissemination of group policy and provides an 
updated group dynamics model to each node as time progresses. For instance, should one 
9 
 
aircraft identify a hazardous condition that is not immediately apparent to the rest of the 
collective, subsequent update requests may provide a warning to the rest of the group as 
the update request is propagated from device to device. The second action is a simple 
direction change request. This may have several purposes, including collision avoidance 
should sensor data to each of the nodes become unavailable, compromised, or obscured. 
Other actions include emergency evasive actions, mission start/end changes, and the last 
request, to change ordering or dominance in a series of aircraft, allowing for a change in 
designated roles from one aircraft to another. 
 This updated system model now represents a small-scale control protocol for a 
network of autonomous aircraft. The aim of this thesis is not to explore this example 
system; for reference purposes, it is simply stating a scenario to which the IDS may be 
applied. 
 
System Integration 
 
 As stated in the introductory 
material, an IDS employing traffic 
analysis at a single point in a device 
network is neither scalable (i.e., resists 
performance degradation as the number of 
devices increases) nor applicable to an ad-
hoc network setup, especially one 
consisting of power-restricted devices Figure 1 - Example of one IDS per node 
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where strenuous computational power requirements yield a major disadvantage in 
implementation. To combat this issue, all of the IDS systems and strategies discussed in 
this document will circumvent a single point of analysis by allowing each connected 
device node to run a specific hardware/software implementation of the IDS mechanism, 
as seen in Figure 1. By using a parallel approach, we can enable multiple-agent feedback, 
if required (though not discussed as a solution in this document) to provide data to a 
variety of intrusion control methods (separate from detection in that it is a solution to a 
detection) such as a reputation system5.  
 Parallelism increases system scalability by removing the burden of analysis from 
one machine monitoring the entire collective, to multiple devices monitoring only their 
relevant intercommunications. For instance, in a traffic-based IDS, a collective of eight 
nodes requires that the IDS monitors all eight nodes. In contrast, in a parallel IDS 
strategy, let us assume that of those eight nodes, nodes A, B and C communicate. In this 
case, the implemented IDS models, with reference to the IDS onboard node A, will only 
need to monitor communications with nodes B and C, assuming that no other 
communications occur. This brings up the important point that none of the methods 
outlined in the next few sections self-monitor behavior – this would be more or less 
redundant when considering a significantly large set of communicating nodes. Self-
referenced IDS mechanisms therefore will not be addressed in this document. 
 
  
                                                 
5
 Reputation Systems will be discussed shortly 
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Reputation Systems 
 
 Buchegger and Le Boudec [29] introduce and detail different methods used to 
form the basis for reputation systems, applicable to the ad-hoc network scenario. Their 
work focuses primarily on developing a system of node-based reputations for 
determining optimal and safe strategies for routing data among the nodes. In their work, 
they show a variety of different trust-based reputation-building mechanisms by which 
nodes that previously have not interacted with each other can determine whether or not 
the nodes are trustworthy based on prior accumulated information about each respective 
node.  
 Central to their work is the propagation of reputation information among nodes 
which forms the basis for the group-wide consensus about the trustworthiness of the 
interconnected nodes. The IDS mechanisms detailed in this thesis focus not on trust 
propagation and group decision making. Rather, the focus is on detection of an intrusion 
based on the observations of a single node with reference to the collective in such a way 
that for N nodes in the network there exist N different system state observations. For this 
reason, the work presented here is not adherent to the concepts of a reputation system. 
 
Operational Cycle Division and Scalability 
 
 When considering performance issues related to embedded device networks, 
scalability becomes of paramount importance in the determinacy of response time. To 
this end, the methods proposed in this document utilize mechanisms to minimize 
12 
 
computational overhead and allow for expanded scalability through the implementation 
of a division between data acquisition cycles of the various IDSs, and data processing and 
analysis cycles. A cycle6 is defined as a “run” of the IDS during which either data is 
collected or analysis is performed.  
 Data Collection Cycles7 are dedicated to handling input requests from connected 
agent nodes. These cycles are of low computational intensity, as they simply map 
received requests to a predefined structure maintaining a history of external requests. In 
the case of the IDSs mentioned here, this structure will be referred to as the Agent 
History Table, which contains all requests received during the IDS runtime. A data 
collection cycle is run for every input data  point, since the update process is lightweight, 
using only an increment operation and a node information update request. The vast 
majority of all cycles performed by the IDS fall under the DCC category. This allows for 
stabilization of input data patterns for purposes of statistical analysis. 
 In contrast to a DCC, a Data Processing Cycle8 is a CPU-intensive IDS run that 
performs the analysis required to identify deviant agents from the node collective. 
Performing a meaningful analysis is dependent on the data collected. This has two 
ramifications; First, it means that power and computational resources can be saved by not 
performing analysis cycles before sufficient data input has been received. Second, 
modifying the execution point of a DPC enables system flexibility by allowing a 
statistically significant change in observed behavior to occur before performing a new 
analysis on the received request inputs. Utilizing the same data structure updated by the 
                                                 
6
 Cycle and Iteration will be used interchangeably 
7
 Abbreviated as DCC, or DC if using the word “cycle” verbosely 
8
 Abbreviated DPC or DP if using the word “cycle” verbosely  
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DCC, the DPC portion of the IDSs determines deviant nodes based on the IDS methods 
described in the following chapters. Typically, the DPC is run based on the number of 
inputs received and the number of nodes in the collective. For all three IDS scenarios, 
excluding the initial exploratory maxima detection system implementation, the DPC is 
run when a counter measuring the number of DCCs exceeds a value computed by the 
product of the number of known, locally connected nodes and the number of possible 
discrete system behaviors. 
 The performance aspects, accuracy, and power/overhead concerns are directly 
affected by the DCC/DPC execution ratios as the IDS runtime progresses. More DPC 
executions cause more computational overhead, but are necessary for any data analysis to 
occur. When properly spaced with enough DCC executions, the IDS’s performance can 
be shaped to scale linearly, or even negligibly as the size of the networked node 
cluster is linearly increased.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
MAXIMA DETECTION 
 
 This section of the document will explain in detail the single-anomaly-detection 
mechanism mentioned in the introduction, and hereby referred to as a Maxima Detection 
System9 [30]. The purpose of this detection algorithm is to provide an accurate 
mechanism for detecting single anomalies within the context of the embedded systems 
platform, while maintaining a simple and lightweight execution profile. Within the scope 
of the Hybrid IDS (as seen in Chapter Five), the MDS allows for identification of either 
one or zero suspicious nodes for calibrating the sensitivity of the Cross-Correlative 
Intrusion Detection System.10 Therefore, the MDS is designed primarily as a first-defense 
and calibration stage for CCIDS to remove the large number of false positives inherent to 
that approach.  
 MDS relies on the creation and updating of probability density functions that 
approximate the observed behavior between nodes interacting with a specific host node. 
To simplify a behavior-based model for purposes of creating an experimental version of 
the MDS, behaviors were categorized statistically and represented by integral data values, 
one per integer, creating an enumerated list of actions and methods. For instance, in the 
scenario of a series of networked autonomous aircraft, a request for position data might 
be assigned logically to integer value ‘1’, a request for attitude data might map to a value 
of ‘2’, and so on. Each of the behaviors is generated according to a probability density 
                                                 
9
 Abbreviated as MDS 
10
 Abbreviated as CCIDS 
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function (PDF) attributed to the frequency of that behavior’s occurrence in an actual 
embedded, real-time system. All probabilities add to 1 to completely represent the 
possible behavior space of the system. Figure 2 demonstrates this concept within the 
scope of a system containing nine separate behaviors. This capability allows the IDS to 
move beyond the scope of a system-specific implementation, abstracting operations at 
one of the highest possible levels, (level 1 is used in this paper) as seen in Figure 3. 
 The classification of an agent as 
deviant is a two-fold process. The first step 
involves the individual, or local-scope 
determination of deviant behavior by each 
agent. This is computed by calculating the 
mean probability of a behavior for the entire set of agents. Let γ be the number of agents 
in the system and let β represent the number of behaviors present in the system. Let η ×  
represent a matrix of dimensions γ × β containing the historically and temporally-updated 
probabilities of a certain behavior ξ. The local-scope mean probability vector, φ is 
computed for each node  in (1). 
 =  ∑ η × 


      (1) 
Figure 2 – Example behavioral PDF 
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 The 
vector φ is 
then 
analyzed for 
global and 
local 
maxima. 
Since 
most of 
the behaviors will likely be statistically represented by a larger maximum peak, deviation 
in the system behavior will likely manifest itself eventually over time as a smaller, local 
maximum, as seen in Figure 4. This smaller local maximum can be correlated to a 
particular behavior, ξ, as the maxima-finding algorithm is set to return a discrete location 
of the occurrence of the maxima.  
 The agent corresponding to the maximally-defined deviant behavior ξd is then 
found by analyzing the column of data in the probability matrix η ×  corresponding to ξd 
and then finding the row within that column containing the maximum value for the given 
ξd with in a certain tolerance value τ, representing a probability value. 
Figure 3 – Behavioral Abstraction Level (#1 used) 
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 The detection strategy 
implemented by MDS therefore 
allows for the detection of a 
single anomaly within a minimal 
requirement for time – a threshold 
is used to detect whether the local 
maximum should be flagged as 
suspicious or not.  
 
Ordering of Data 
 
 MDS, because of its maxima detection mechanism, has an inherent requirement 
for normalization of input data. This means that all the theory and methodology presented 
here assumes Gaussian or other normalization of the data set. Figure 4 shows common 
data represented by a Chi-Squared distribution, which allows detected maxima to be 
much more easily distinguished, as far as the eye can see. To an extent, a Chi-Squared 
distribution will yield optimal results, as “normal” behaviors are skewed to the left (or 
right) while deviant behaviors, in an ideal circumstance, will be represented on the 
opposite side of the mean behavioral vector PDF.  
 Of course, theory differs from actual implementation and operation, and thus 
deviant behaviors will not always be skewed properly. However, a generalized attempt at 
ordering is essential to the proper functionality of MDS. The specific ordering 
methodology is not discussed here, as the result data is generated using a pre-ordered set 
Figure 4 - Detected Local Maximum - possible indicator of deviant 
behavior 
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(the interactive requests are generated 
such that the input results will have 
some form of normalized ordering.) 
However, it would not be difficult to 
implement an ordering technique 
based on simply tracking action/label 
frequencies and then re-ordering the 
behavioral frequency column labels 
appropriately.  
 
DPC Configuration 
 
 Because maxima detection is based on accumulating a statistically significant 
number of requests over time, having a greater number of nodes in the device network 
will decrease the time required to stabilize the detected maximum. This is because a 
greater collection of nodes yields more request data points and subsequently more 
uniform average representation. Therefore, the smaller the node collective, the more 
DCCs are required per DPC for stabilization purposes. Furthermore, more DPCs will 
need to be run to converge accurately. This behavior is analyzed in the hybridized IDS 
chapter. 
 
  
Figure 5 - MATLAB-based implementation system diagram 
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Implementation 
 
 The MDS was originally implemented in an exploratory phase using MATLAB 7 
to determine its viability and performance. The detection system was comprised of nine 
core modules, consisting of an agent controller execution program, followed by data 
handling units, machine learning aspects, the maxima detection system itself, and the 
simulated data generation portion. These components can be seen in Figure 5. Two 
objects maintained the status of the system, and are identified by the shaded, three-
dimensional boxes. The first of which is referred to as a “behavior” unit, containing the 
basic abstraction data including requesting node and the actual request made. The 
behavior units themselves, corresponding over time to the average system state, were 
managed though a behavior stack, containing a set of pushed behaviors received from the 
interconnected nodes. The purpose of the stack was to delay an overall update to the state 
of the system, allowing for a more stable, characteristic update containing more data 
points, thereby eliminating the impact of a single data point on the stability of the system. 
Once a preset number of behaviors was collected in the stack, the stack contents were 
popped and averaged into the overall system profile. As an intermediary between the 
average system representation and the behavioral stacks, a matrix representing individual 
nodes and their behavioral labels is used to maintain the total number of interactions 
present within the system. Useful for debugging purposes, this history matrix eventually 
became one of the most important foundations in hybridizing MDS, and the cross-
correlating IDS, as will be seen in the section referring to the two-system hybridization. 
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 Because of promising results and a general degree of operability within the 
simulation environment, MDS was ported to the Java 5 runtime standard, allowing for 
ubiquitous device integration provided a Java Runtime Environment11 that could be run 
on the platform in question. The Java implementation was added only within the context 
of the hybridized IDS, so a free-form Java implementation of the MDS is not available 
for evaluation as it relies heavily on an implementation framework comprising the two 
systems, and derived from the cross-correlative IDS to be discussed in the next section. 
 
Performance 
 
 This section will discuss the performance of MDS with respect to deviant agent 
pervasion – the density of malicious nodes expressed as a percentage of the homogeneous 
device network. In order to maintain similar metrics through the course of this document, 
the original MATLAB implementation will not be used as the benchmark case 
application; rather, the efficacy of MDS will be analyzed as a performance component of 
the hybridized IDS discussed in Chapter 5.  
 Because MDS can only detect at most one malicious agent, it does not make sense 
to discuss MDS performance in the case of more than one anomalous agent per device 
network. This constraint leads to a very small measurable amount of description and 
performance evaluation, so the metrics utilized for MDS performance will relate the 
number of fluctuations MDS undergoes during its detection algorithm as the pervasion 
density increases. To clarify this a bit, consider a case in which 30 device nodes exist on 
                                                 
11
 JRE 
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the homogeneous device network. If on this network, there exists a malicious node 
pervasion of 20%, (i.e., six deviant agents exist), MDS will detect at least one of the six 
nodes within its first iteration. However, during subsequent cycles, the exact detected 
node may shift between any of the six potentially deviant nodes. This is expected 
behavior, since the local maximum will shift among the various deviant nodes as time 
progresses and more data is gathered. 
 Because the most viable MDS implementation exists within the hybrid IDS 
context discussed in Chapter 5, the discussion and data generated for and collected from 
MDS mechanisms will be sourced from the hybrid IDS scenario. Despite this, the 
performance and specifications are unique, in component context, to MDS behaviors and 
system performance. For more information regarding actual data obtained from the MDS 
component of the hybridized system, the reader is directed to Appendix A for raw data 
and performance statistics. 
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 Figure 6 - Variation of the single detected node number over time (as DPCs increase) 
 
 Figure 6 demonstrates that MDS is relatively stable in selecting a node to identify 
with a fixed node cluster size of 20 agents, with a varying percentage of deviant nodes  
from five to 27%. The number of nodes representing the deviant nodes always included 
node number 20, and included more nodes progressively, adding 19, 18, 17, 16 and 
eventually 15 as the pervasion percentage increased. Ironically, the greatest instability 
occurs in one of the simplest test cases, yielding an incorrect initial identification of node 
number 2. This initial identification anomaly shows that it is important to alter the 
number of MDS cycles based on the context of the application. All other trials identified 
correct nodes at all times, typically selecting node number n or (n-1) for a scenario 
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consisting of n nodes. This is primarily due to the statistical distribution of the PDF, and 
is not a characteristic of MDS.  
 Let it be noted that Figure 6 does not identify the number of detected nodes, but 
rather identifies a single detected node number as the MDS progresses through DPCs. It 
should be mentioned that the deviant node number index value is predetermined by the 
dataset, and is not influenced by position; node number 20 was always detected in this 
dataset because input conditions always specified the deviant behavior as occurring under 
node 20, among others, for instance. MDS would just as easily identify a deviant node 
placed at any other index (e.g., the deviant nodes being represented by node numbers 4, 5 
and 6 in the collective of 20. Node 4, 5 or 6 would then be conclusively detected by the 
MDS.) 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CROSS-CORRELATIVE IDS 
 
 This section of the document will detail the system and methods of the cross-
correlative IDS portion, hereby referred to as a CCIDS12. Based on using the properties of 
vector/matrix cross correlation[22], the CCIDS provides features not present in MDS 
such as a greater response flexibility, and more importantly, the ability to detect multiple 
anomalies within a collective of nodes. This is accomplished through the implementation 
of a mathematical cross-correlation operation that assigns scores to individual node 
behavior averages with respect to the overall system behavior. Like MDS, the CCIDS 
utilizes the same level of abstraction to represent behaviors in the system. This allows 
CCIDS to later be integrated and hybridized with MDS and allowing them to share 
similar historical information that accurately and homogeneously represents the system 
state. Also like MDS, the CCIDS utilizes a similar data structure, the agent history table, 
to record and organize input system behaviors for eventual analysis. To see how CCIDS 
uses this datastructure, let Λ represent a matrix of dimensions m x n containing the 
binned, recorded request histories for m nodes and n classification labels. Let η represent 
the row-summed and averaged vector derived from Λ containing an overall probability 
distribution representing the overall state of the system according to the classification 
labels. Lastly, let  represent a transposed vector containing the individual averaged 
probability distribution of a behavior for a particular node number  ∈ . The scores  
from the resulting cross-correlation are obtained by  =  ∙  ∀  ∈ . (2) 
                                                 
12
 Cross-Correlative Intrusion Detection System 
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 The resulting vector containing the cross-correlation scores for each node is 
analyzed according to a threshold specified in the IDS runtime environment. Although 
the vector product operations are not significantly process-intensive for smaller number 
of agents because the cross-correlation is performed on linear vectors, the nature of the 
embedded platform requires the minimization of unnecessary computations to save on 
power and resource requirements. To meet this goal, and to allow for the system to 
experience change on a global basis without severely affecting the model’s integrity and 
anomaly detection resolution, the cross-correlations are performed based on the number 
of input requests received, regardless of their origins. This allows for the accumulation of 
a statistically relevant number of request classifications to be added to each correlation 
run, and minimizes the impact of a smaller-scale anomaly within a node that may not be 
malicious but rather the result of an unforeseen consequence of the task being processed 
at the time. 
 With this control mechanism in place, the scores are analyzed by comparing each 
score in (2) to an average composite score generated from all the score entries. Should 
one or more nodes deviate from the average score according to a specified tolerance 
value, the node is flagged as suspicious and added to a list containing suspected nodes, 
maintained separately by each device. 
 
Thresholding 
 
 Central to permitting CCIDS deviant node identification, threshold-based 
detection sets a point at which an individual node score must deviate from the 
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average/composite score to be flagged as suspicious. The selected threshold must be 
particular to the application context in which the CCIDS is deployed, and thus must be 
selected manually (or via a hybridized approach as detailed later in Chapter 5). The 
results of selected thresholding are seen later on in this chapter, in Figure 9. 
 The initial threshold values, , selected for CCIDS (and primarily the hybrid 
approach in Chapter 5) stem from a 100% deviation in the average node score. For this 
entire document, the dataset in use created an average score, , of approximately 0.2. 
The determination of a deviant node is made if  ≥  −  where ψ represents the 
selected threshold, is true. Therefore, to create the initial threshold , the value was 
originally set to 0.2 to represent the 100% deviation. This implies that only scores 
exceeding the average by plus or minus 100% would register as suspicious. Of course, 
such a case would be rare, and thus Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate initial thresholds 
required for detection to converge via CCIDS, implying that 100% deviation is too 
extreme a condition for most general purposes. 
 
Implementation 
 
 The CCIDS portion was originally implemented in the Java 1.5 framework, with 
the intention of execution on a lightweight ARM9 development platform. The 
implementation structure itself is designed to maximize modularity and implementation 
flexibility. This also permitted integration of MDS to form the hybridized IDS discussed 
in the next chapter with minimal modifications due to the object-oriented nature of the 
IDS implementation.  
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 The IDS itself is composed of seven core class modules and a number of 3rd-party 
helper objects. The modules are broken down as follows: 
1. Manager application – responsible for instantiating the IDS environment and 
managing its operation 
2. NodeManager class – responsible for instantiating objects relating to each node’s 
interaction histories. Spawns associated AgentHistoryTable instances, as well as 
HistoryObjects. 
3. HistoryObject – contains a vector mapping request instances for each node for 
which the IDS is logging activity. For example, if the IDS is running on aircraft 
A, HistoryObject instances are created for nodes B, C, and so on. 
4. AgentHistoryTable – each IDS maintains one such object containing the overall 
binned histories for all nodes versus all requests. Represented by Λ. 
5. IDSEngine – This object is instantiated by the Manager to perform single or 
multiple-anomaly detection based on data contained in the AgentHistoryTable 
object instance. This unit is the 
most critical component and 
analytical tool of the IDS 
system. 
6. ScoreUnit – A helper 
class used by IDSEngine 
7. IOManager – used for 
file-based or network-based 
retrieval of requests made to the 
Figure 7 - CCIDS Java component diagram 
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IDS’s host system. 
Figure 7 shows the derivative arrangement of the CCIDS, with the Manager application 
controlling overall execution and instantiating calls to the data collection, data 
management, and score analysis modules.  
 
Performance 
 
 Unlike MDS, the CCIDS portion does not require a logical ordering of labeled 
data into a Gaussian or other normalized distribution. This reduces dependence on input 
data ordering and organization, but results in an extreme dependence on tuning/tolerance 
factors. While MDS remains sturdier as far as tuning requirements are concerned, 
CCIDS’s efficacy varies greatly based on the selected tolerance values.  
 To measure IDS performance based on CCIDS performance alone, this section 
will focus on tuning thresholds required to achieve convergence from the CCIDS. A 
properly tuned CCIDS mechanism 
will properly identify the deviant 
agents within its first performance 
iteration (DPC). In addition to the 
tuning thresholds, convergence versus 
deviant node pervasion (the 
percentage proportion of deviant 
Figure 8 - Average required threshold for CCIDS convergence 
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nodes vs. all the nodes in the homogeneous device network) becomes a factor in 
assessing system performance. The reader will note that the data used in these results was 
generated from the hybrid IDS approach detailed in the next chapter. While the hybrid 
IDS will alter the tunings for CCIDS dynamically, the data from the upcoming section 
still represents accurate runtime information, in its component breakdown, for a CCIDS-
only implementation provided that only CCIDS data is analyzed in context with the 
optimized tuning parameters.  
 Figure 8 represents the average threshold required for convergence of the CCIDS 
based on a varying pervasion of deviant nodes within the node network. The surface plot, 
shown in Figure 9, illustrates the varying required threshold for convergence based on not 
only pervasion, but also the number of nodes in the collective as a whole. The behavior 
can generally be regarded as linearly dependent on pervasion, not the number of nodes. 
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Figure 9 - Required threshold for CCIDS convergence with varied deviant node pervasion and network size 
 
 It is noted that in some circumstances (when the threshold exceeded 22%, for 
instance), despite having selected a threshold, CCIDS never converged upon a solution, 
or did so poorly. For information regarding these cases, the reader is invited to examine 
trial data presented in Appendix A. 
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False Positives 
 
 Because of the multiple anomaly detection capability, CCIDS consequently 
suffers from its tendency to detect false positives more frequently than MDS. Because the 
criterion for selecting and identifying a malicious node is completely based upon the 
selection of a proper threshold, this consequently requires careful tuning of this threshold 
within the execution context of the functioning system. This raises the question of how 
such a threshold should be applied if false positives are detected within the first execution 
iteration of the CCIDS. The answer to this lies in the provision of training data and 
intelligent tuning of the threshold such that only true positives (actual deviant nodes) are 
found within the behavioral dataset.  
 Training data is defined quantitatively and proportionally dependent on the 
number of connected nodes in the collective, and the number of overall 
behaviors/interactions possible within the system context. For a large number of 
connected nodes, the behavior, theoretically, becomes established more rapidly, since 
more devices will be exhibiting similar behaviors. Similarly, a smaller number of 
behaviors requires less time for the system to stabilize, since the statistical representation 
of a larger number of behavior classes will take longer to receive data points as the 
number of behaviors increases towards infinity. This leads to a conclusion that the 
threshold must be tuned according to several factors present within the system context at 
initialization time of the homogeneous device network. The complexity arising from the 
requirement for training data is resolved in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
HYBRID IDS 
 
 The individual approaches to homogeneous device network security, as presented 
by the intrusion detection tactics of MDS and CCIDS, provide a partial solution to the 
overall issue of identifying deviant nodes in a homogeneous device network. Each system 
is tailored to provide a particular benefit, such as not needing training data in the MDS 
case, or providing multiple anomaly detection, in the CCIDS case. However, neither 
solution can offer the full protection of a combined approach, drawing from the strengths 
of both systems to surmount their respective weaknesses in a symbiotic manner. This IDS 
approach will be referred to as a Hybrid IDS or HybrIDS for the purposes of this 
document. 
 The primary principle governing the operation of HybrIDS consists of the 
sequential operation of MDS and CCIDS. More specifically, the lack of temporal 
requirements for single-anomaly detection specified in MDS can be used to tune the 
detection threshold for the CCIDS portion of the system. This produces accurate results 
that are found almost immediately, which can be used to actively remove instances of 
false positives present in the multiple results from CCIDS. To do so, HybrIDS 
implements a switching algorithm that determines whether conditions have been met to 
transition from the primary to secondary stage of the IDS (MDS to CCIDS). This 
algorithm will be referred to as the Hybrid State. The end product of the Hybrid State is a 
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timing value, Tau, which determines how many DCCs are required before transition from 
first to second stage.  
 The Hybrid State is an elementary data structure that computes the value of Tau in 
DCCs by taking into account three critical system components that are the most 
influential in determining transition requirements for the homogeneous device network. 
The first is the number of connected nodes. As the number of nodes  increases, there is 
a higher likelihood that an increased device presence will stabilize the overall system 
behavior. The second component involves the number of overall system behaviors 
present in the system. As the number of behaviors increases, so does the time (in cycles) 
for all the behaviors to experience a representative number of data points. If β represents 
the number of behaviors present in the system (represented by a set of behavior-separated 
bins into which collected data points can fall into), and  ! represents the number of 
DCCs required for an average stabilization, then the function  = "#$%| $ → ∞ is a 
constantly increasing function. The third component is a variable function, )#% that 
returns a constant multiplicand that modifies the effect of the two prior systems to 
determine Tau in terms of  !. 
The resulting Tau in number of 
DCCs  can be expressed as: 
* = + × $ × ,#-% 
where + is a pre-determined 
software-related constant issued 
before run-time and where the 
Figure 10 - Represents the returned gamma function value to yield 
IDS transition 
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function )#% can be expressed by a non-linear function based on the number of input 
node agents. Seen in Figure 10, the function was derived experimentally and 
approximates a logarithmic increase, such that agent groups with larger numbers of nodes 
do not immediately transition IDS stages. 
 The returned value of )#% allows the overall function *#+, $, -% to exhibit a 
surface of values for the Hybrid State in terms of  ! as shown 
 
Figure 11 - Surface of possible Tau values (for IDS transition) versus number of nodes (Gamma) and number of 
behaviors (Beta) 
 
in Figure 11 when the value of + = 4 (selected to reduce runtime and increase 
accuracy.) Because of an algorithm implemented in CCIDS, the number of DPC 
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executions performed is proportional to the system behaviors and nodes as well, so while 
there is a significant overall increase in the number of DC cycles as nodes increase, the 
number of DCCs per DPC decreases. This can be seen in Figure 12. 
 
Hybrid State Control Flow and MDS/CCIDS Transition 
  
 HybrIDS relies on the Boolean state of the Hybrid State object. Should the correct 
number of DCCs have passed according to the Tau function detailed in the previous 
section, the MDS state will be false and the CCIDS state will resolve to true. Following 
Figure 12 - Normalized surface representing IDS transitions based on selected Tau (dependent on environmental 
configuration) 
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this state change, the IDS will begin a transitory phase in which the long-term results of 
MDS are used to calibrate the evaluative results of the initial set of CCIDS iterations.  
 This transitory phase involves an output 
suspected agent vector, λ, which contains the 
findings of the MDS phase. It is noted that 
max#dim #5%% = 1, since MDS can at most yield 
one suspected agent vector. Else, λ may be null. 
Also critical to the transitory phase is the suspected 
agent vector ξ, which contains the evaluative 
findings of the CCIDS phase. Given the set of all n 
possible agent nodes, 78, the relationship between 
ξ and α is such that 9 ⊆ ;<=. This implies that the 
maximal set of possible deviant nodes can be some 
or all of the connected nodes except for one, which must exist for the cross correlation to 
have any meaning. Given sets λ and ξ, the transition phase involves the constant changing 
of the tuning threshold until the condition 5 ⊆ 9 is satisfied. The threshold value begins 
at a default state and is tuned either positively or negatively until the desired subset 
condition is reached. The logical flow of the transitioning mechanism can be seen in 
Figure 13. 
 
  
Figure 13 - IDS transition logic flowchart 
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Implementation and Architecture 
 
 HybrIDS is implemented according to the Java 2 version 1.5 Standard Edition 
API, according to the design and previous implementation of CCIDS. In fact, the 
hybridization component and MDS engine were added onto the existing CCIDS 
framework, though their integration effects a critical and fundamental change in the 
nature and properties of the system. Many concepts and execution primitives from 
CCIDS were maintained, and added to the Java port of the MDS portion of the HybrIDS. 
The resulting framework yielded a number of important properties: modularity, 
homogeneity, and a shared data infrastructure. 
 The most significant changes to the architecture is the addition of the MDS 
engine, and the conversion of the primary IDS Engine to the CCIDS subcomponent, as 
shown in Figure 14. Other minor changes include changes to the IDS management 
system and the application management system, both of which were altered to allow for 
IDS phase transitioning and sequential execution. Sequential execution is still governed 
by the same DCC/DPC cycle management scheme originally developed for the stand-
alone CCIDS. 
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Figure 14 - HybrIDS Java component diagram 
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 One of the largest benefits of the Java-based implementation and concurrency 
with previous development practices is the resulting data sharing occurring between the 
two IDS systems – the sharing of the Agent History Table. This data structure, 
originating from the CCIDS Java implementation, but also present in the original 
MATLAB 7 implementation of the MDS, contains the machine-learning elements critical 
to temporal and statistical system behavior determination. A single instance of this object 
is created and passed by reference to the various subcomponents and engines of the IDS, 
minimizing the required memory footprint. Let θ represent the resident memory size of 
the Agent History Table in bytes, and ε represent the memory footprint of a 64-bit double 
datatype. The total resident memory size is then  
> =  $ × ;< ×
?
8
 
 For a typical agent history table consisting of 35 agents and 10 behaviors, the 
memory footprint of the associated IDS’s Agent History Table would be a maximum of 
2.73 kilobytes. Because the Agent History Table is the most memory-intensive portion of 
the entire IDS, maintaining the historical and machine learning components required to 
track system behaviors, it is easy to see why this HybrIDS model is extremely adaptable 
to real-time and embedded system architectures, where memory and computational 
resources are at a minimum. Further design considerations include compact compiled 
application size (compiled as a Java JAR file), not exceeding 46 kilobytes of required 
storage space.  
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Performance 
 
 The as-tested performance of the HybrIDS showed significant improvements in 
the detection accuracy over the single IDS case of either MDS or CCIDS. The 
improvements were so vast that each and every system trial resulted in a 100% accurate 
detection at the transition intervals selected within a certain range of deviant node 
pervasion. The number of transitioning iterations and number of iterations before 
accurate detection for either MDS or CCIDS were utilized as performance metrics to 
evaluate the efficiency of the HybrIDS. The test scenarios varied in the percentage of 
malicious node pervasion, as well as the number of nodes used in the test. An overall 
figure representing the total number of DPCs for all portions (MDS, CCIDS and 
transition) was also included during evaluation. Approximately 383MB of trial scenario 
data was generated to be used as the basis for inter-node device requests seen from the 
perspective of a single node.  
 Two sets of graphs will be presented in this section: The first set contains three 
Figure 15 - Average transition cycles vs. percentage of deviant 
nodes 
Figure 16 - Enumerated transition cycles vs. percentage of 
deviant nodes 
41 
 
graphs with data about the number of tuning cycles required between the MDS and 
CCIDS phases such that CCIDS may be properly tuned to avoid false positives while 
accurately detecting the multiple anomalous nodes. The graphs will display this 
information as 1.) an average, 2.) as an interpolated multi-trace plot, and 3.) as an 
interpolated three-dimensional surface plot. The second set of graphs will represent in 
various ways the total number of DPCs consumed by the entire IDS process, including 
the MDS, CCIDS and transition portions. The same graph methodology from the first set 
will also be observed.  
 
Figure 17 - Surface of required transition cycles vs. percentage of deviant nodes and size of network 
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Figure 20 - Surface of total IDS DPCs vs. percentage of deviant nodes vs. total network size; High peaks 
occurring above 22% pervasion indicate significant instability/low rate of convergence. Some non-converged 
values were averaged. 
Figure 18 - Average number of DPCs (total) vs. deviant node 
pervasion 
Figure 19 - Enumerated number of DPCs (total) vs. 
deviant node pervasion 
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 Figure 17 demonstrates that the number of tuning cycles necessitated by a 
particular concentration of deviant nodes within the device network is based almost 
exclusively and linearly by the percentage of deviant nodes. The number of transition 
cycles is also linearly dependent on the starting value for the CCIDS threshold, which is 
not seen in any of the figures. It is feasible to reduce the number of overall iterations by 
starting with a lower threshold, but this may be ill advised given that some CCIDS 
threshold are very close to the starting threshold value of 0.20. Figure 15 demonstrates, 
when taken into account with Figure 16, that the number of DPCs dedicated to tuning 
CCIDS is relatively independent of the total number of agents on the device network. In 
this case, the single-most deciding factor is the percentage of pervasion. It is notable that 
there are some differences between the behavioral curves when considering the number 
of tuning cycles, which can be attributed to non-convergence in a few particular cases, 
necessitating an interpolation so that the graphs may be comparable in nature. 
 During the data generation phase, trials were generated with differing numbers of 
deviant agents, to create the different pervasion scenarios depicted in the figures. Because 
the number of agents must correspond to an integral number, it is noted that not all of the 
percentages are exact. To illustrate this, given a collective of 30 nodes with a 15% 
pervasion, the returned requirement of the test data indicates a need for 4.5 deviant nodes. 
Since a fractional node is an impossible scenario, in this case, the actual selected dataset 
corresponded to 5 deviant nodes out of a total of 30 nodes. This is relatively close to 
16.7%, which means that the computation of 30 nodes for the 17% pervasion case also 
computed 5/30 deviant nodes. This explains some of the discrepancies in Figure 18, 
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especially where the stair-step-like behavior of some of the cluster sizes is observed. The 
stair-step nature is due mostly to some replication of scenario data between pervasion 
percentages. A uniform rounding and computation algorithm was applied to indicate 
which trial datasets should be used, such that the overall test scenario would tend to 
behave more or less the same way, despite replications among datasets.  
 Figure 20 shows a three-dimensional surface representation, interpolated, of the 
number of transition cycles required to set MDS properly. This surface yields a more 
palpable view of the pervasion density impact on the number transition cycles required to 
tune the HybrIDS. 
 Figures 18 and 19 paint a very different picture from the transition cycle graphs. 
Here we see the real-world effects of the higher pervasion percentages. Because the 
tuning-based graphs will always display a somewhat linear response, due to a threshold 
limit of how low or high the IDS can be tuned, non-convergent systems will still display 
an upper bound in terms of tuning cycles. This is not the case with the overall system 
behavior. As seen in Figure 19, where it is labeled “Start of CCIDS convergence 
anomalies”, the number of total cycles begins to deteriorate with respect to previous 
system performance. This is in a large part due to CCIDS tuning factors not being able to 
go lower – in essence, the CCIDS is “on its own” despite MDS’s best efforts to calibrate 
it. In some cases, despite the most flexible tuning, CCIDS can converge, but only after an 
unusually long and generally impractical period of time. The symptoms of this begin 
right around 22% pervasion, and fluctuate significantly as the system approaches 27% 
pervasion. In other cases, the CCIDS portion simply did not converge at all. Because of 
plotting software, discontinuities are unsupported, and therefore average total cycle 
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response times were interpolated into cases which did not converge. Please see Appendix 
A for a complete table detailing cases in which convergence was not possible. 
 In several cases, the convergence period became unreliably large – sometimes 
exceeding 100 DPCs (a number indicating that ten or a hundred thousand data points 
have been accumulated before convergence has resulted.) Because data processing cycles 
are dependent on the influx of a relatively large number of input data, a detection 
convergence requirement of this many DPCs is generally deemed unacceptable. This 
arises from the fact that it is difficult to tell whether or not a dataset would converge or 
not after so many cycles, representing a generally long period of time during a 
homogeneous device network’s “mission span.”  
 
Hybridized Outlook and Discussion 
 
 As described earlier in the CCIDS chapter of this document, one of the goals in 
terms of system-wide efficiency is the independence of the system from the number of 
devices present in the system. This goal is met by MDS, and further continued by the 
HybrIDS version, as seen in Figure 20. It is apparent that as the number of nodes 
increases, there is generally no increase, but rather even a slight decrease, in the number 
of DPCs required for convergence. Other expected findings, such as the increase in 
transition cycles corresponding to changes in pervasion, are to be expected. When 
viewing this from a broader perspective, the tuning threshold has a maximum possible 
impact on the system’s overall convergence time requirement. Therefore, in the long run, 
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the transition performance is not as detrimental with respect to a worst-case scenario as 
the individual performance of CCIDS. 
 For the scenario setup described in the concepts and CCIDS sections, it can be 
concluded that the HybrIDS mechanism is effective, therefore, with pervasion 
percentages reaching approximately 22% before system-wide behavior and response 
becomes non-deterministic, or at least non-representative of a reasonable performance 
envelope. There is some room for improvement, as tuning specific methods and 
mechanisms in both MDS and CCIDS phases can yield a higher degree of sensitivity, 
situational forgiveness, and accuracy. One such proposed method would be to add a 
method of tracking the positives that are detected. It is very worthwhile to note that 
during the CCIDS portion, all of the malicious nodes were properly identified at all times. 
It is the inclusion of false positives for excessive periods of time that defined whether, for 
testing purposes, the system converged or not. Therefore, by keeping track of the 
dynamic nature of the positives identifications generated, false-positives included, it is 
theoretically possible to eliminate contenders representing the false positive occurrence 
from the suspected node list based on its temporal manifestations on said list.  
 Given its observed behavior using the generated datasets, HybrIDS demonstrates 
its adaptability to the embedded device platform. By representing interactions with a 
scheme employing a high level of abstraction, it minimizes computational intensity 
through mediation via DPC data management and transitional IDS process mediation. It 
is capable of accurately identifying anomalous networked nodes with a pervasion density 
of up to 22%, and is scalable to a large number of networked nodes with minimal impact 
on response time and performance. Finally, a compact implementation form factor (46 
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kilobytes when compiled as a JAR file) coupled with a small memory footprint (the 
largest data structure occupies 2.73 kilobytes) and a ubiquitous port and runtime 
environment as supplied by the Java 1.5 standard, ensures seamless integration and a 
large degree of applicability to various device classes and categories. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The increasing presence of specialized, embedded devices within the context of a 
networked scenario, such as in the case of a collective of specialized autonomous 
vehicles, including tactical and civilian aircraft, automobiles and aquatic vehicles, 
requires an updated perspective on security and network integrity protection. To this end, 
equipping traditional methods of data confidentiality, source authentication and data 
integrity with methods of intrusion detection can bolster the security of networked agents, 
especially in the case scenario of a network of homogeneous device nodes.  
 Important to integrating an IDS to an embedded device architecture is creating a 
system methodology in which a high level of operational abstraction provides a 
contextual detachment and an isometric system of analysis between all nodes of the 
device network. Likewise, a small system footprint (both in memory and executable 
storage space) along with a reduction in the number of overall computations is required to 
satisfy power requirements and computational resource limitation. The single and hybrid 
IDS systems outlined in this thesis represent a combinational approach to meeting the 
requirements stated above. By utilizing a small memory footprint, and discretizing 
processor-intensive tasks to deterministic time points, the IDSs provide an optimized 
approach to lightweight intrusion detection. 
 MDS and CCIDS represent cases where two different approaches have respective 
strengths in resource utilization, a requirement or lack thereof of training data, and the 
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ability or lack thereof of multiple agent detection. MDS has demonstrated its speed in 
detecting the presence of an intrusion, without the need for training data, and in a manner 
that almost always detects the intrusion accurately. When tuned properly, MDS proves to 
be the most effective in finding the occurrence of an intrusion, when presented with a 
homogeneous device network and a pre-existing set of behaviors and network size. MDS 
takes its inherent speed from a thresholded analysis of an averaged PDF representing the 
overall state of the system. Because the detected local maximum, excluding the global 
maximum, are only representative of one node, MDS cannot be used to detect the 
presence of more than one deviant node in the network. This does not exclude the fact 
that vacillations in the detected suspect node can be used to appropriately identify 
potential offenders. However, because of the nature of the PDF distribution, a reasonable 
number of MDS cycles is required to yield the desired suspected agent resolution. 
HybrIDS recognizes this requirement and bases the number of MDS iterations on the 
speed of accumulated data as the system receives request inputs.  
 In contrast to MDS, CCIDS resolves the single-detection deficiency by providing 
multiple suspected agent resolution. This comes at the cost of requiring precise tuning of 
internal thresholding levels to achieve accurate detection. CCIDS is flexible to responses 
in system changes as a mission might update. However, because of the tuning 
requirement, CCIDS must be provided with an array of sample training data that may not 
be available in a dynamic system-wide execution context. The lack of this training data 
yields an unstable and non-deterministic IDS strategy that on its own is incapable of 
providing significant results to IDS functionality. 
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 With these various strengths and weaknesses, it is therefore logical to consider a 
hybridized approach, in an attempt to reduce the deficiencies of either system by using 
combined identification capabilities to provide an overall solution to intrusion detection. 
HybrIDS provides this solution by integrating the single intrusion detection, high-speed 
case as a reference point to tune the secondary IDS stage, making use of the multiple 
anomaly detection capabilities that work well when tuned properly by the first stage. A 
transitioning system allows for the system to perform in a deterministic, expected 
manner. As the data demonstrates, an increase in the number of connected nodes does not 
contribute to an increase in overall execution and convergence time. This yields an 
important advantage for scalability reasons. The only performance penalty comes in the 
form of advanced pervasion, affecting only the number of DPCs required for tuning the 
CCIDS stage. The overall convergence and runtime is largely unaffected. 
 Coupled with a small executable file size, in a platform-independent 
implementation utilizing minimal memory resources for optimal resource management, 
the HybrIDS approach yields a practical IDS methodology applicable to a range of 
embedded devices within the networked context. Together with existing intrusion 
prevention mechanisms such as encryption, authentication and signature methods, the 
proposed HybrIDS can provide an extra, necessary level of dynamic protection to both 
established and yet undeveloped embedded device network architectures.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
TRIAL RUN DATA 
 
0% Deviant Agents Category       
#Nodes MDS DPCs CCIDS DPCS HybrIDS DPCs Transition Cycles 
10 10 1 11 0 
20 7 1 8 0 
30 6 1 7 0 
40 5 1 6 0 
50 4 1 5 0 
60 3 1 4 0 
70 3 1 4 0 
80 3 1 4 0 
90 3 1 4 0 
 
5% 
Deviant       
7% 
Deviant       
MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles 
10 1 18 7 10 1 18 7 
7 1 13 5 7 1 16 8 
6 1 12 5 6 1 14 7 
5 1 10 4 5 1 12 6 
4 1 9 4 4 1 11 6 
3 1 8 4 3 1 10 6 
3 1 9 5 3 1 10 6 
3 1 7 3 3 1 9 5 
3 1 8 4 3 1 9 5 
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12% 
Deviant       
15% 
Deviant       
MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles 
10 1 24 13 10 1 24 13 
7 1 19 11 7 1 19 11 
6 1 17 10 6 1 19 12 
5 1 16 10 5 1 17 11 
4 1 13 8 4 1 16 11 
3 1 14 10 3 1 15 11 
3 1 13 9 3 1 15 11 
3 1 13 9 3 1 15 11 
3 1 13 9 3 1 16 12 
 
17% 
Deviant       
20% 
Deviant       
MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles 
10 1 24 13 10 1 24 13 
7 1 22 14 7 1 22 14 
6 1 21 14 6 1 21 14 
5 1 19 13 5 1 20 14 
4 1 18 13 4 1 19 14 
3 1 17 13 3 1 18 14 
3 1 16 12 3 1 19 15 
3 1 16 12 3 1 18 14 
3 1 17 13 3 1 19 15 
 
22% 
Deviant       
25% 
Deviant       
MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles 
10 N/C   19 10 N/C   19 
7 1 24 16 7 1 24 16 
6 3 25 16 6 37 61 18 
5 1 21 15 5 3 24 16 
4 1 20 15 4 2 23 17 
3 2 21 16 3 5 24 16 
3 1 20 16 3 54 75 18 
3 2 21 16 3 4 24 17 
3 2 21 16 3 84 105 18 
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27% 
Deviant       
MDS CCIDS HybrIDS T-Cycles 
10 N/C   19 
7 1 27 19 
6 N/C   N/A 
5 9 32 18 
4 16 38 18 
3 19 40 18 
3 N/C   19 
3 N/C   19 
3 N/C   19 
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